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CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS-INDEMNIFICATION OF EXPEN-
SES INCURRED IN DEFENSE OF CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT-Plaintiff, Soren-
son, contracted with defendant, Overland Corporation, to become one of 
its directors, and the contract was approved by Overland's stockholders. 
After he began to serve as a director, Sorenson was made a party defend-
ant to a stockholder's derivative suit attacking the propriety of his con-
tract of employment with Overland. The derivative suit terminated in 
favor of Sorenson and he then brought an action for reimbursement of 
the counsel fees incurred by him in defending the stockholder's action. 
Plaintiff's action was under a corporate by-law providing that the cor-
poration shall indemnify directors and officers against expenses incurred 
by them in successfully defending any action in which they are in-
volved by reason of "being or having been" a director or officer of that 
corporation.1 On appeal from summary judgment for defendant, held, 
affirmed. The stockholder's suit was based on a matter which arose be-
fore plaintiff became a director and was not by reason of his "being or 
having been" a director. The contract was made by plaintiff in his 
individual capacity, not as a director, and did not come within the 
protection of the by-law. Sorenson v. Overland Corp., (3d Cir. 1957) 242 
F. (2d) 70. 
The by-law under which plaintiff sought reimbursement is specifically 
authorized by Delaware statute.2 An earlier decision interpreting the 
l Article XXIII. "Indemnification of Directors and Officers. The corporation shall 
indemnify each director and officer of the corporation against all or any portion of any 
expenses reasonably incurred by him in connection with or arising out of any action, 
suit or proceeding in which he may be involved by reason of his being or having been 
an officer or director of the corporation. . . • The corporation shall not, however, in-
demnify such director or officer with respect to matters as to which he shall be finally 
adjudged in any such action, suit or proceeding to have been derelict in the performance 
of his duty as such director or officer •••• The foregoing right of indemnification shall 
not be exclusive of other rights to which any director or officer may be entitled as a 
matter of law." 
2 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §122 (10). "Every corporation created under the provi-
sions of this chapter shall have power to-(10) Indemnify any and all of its directors or 
officers or former directors or officers . • • against expenses actually and necessarily 
incurred by them in connection with the defense of any action, suit or proceeding in 
which they, or any of them, are made parties, or a party, by reason of being or having 
been directors or officers or a director or officer of the corporation ••. except in relation 
to matters as to which any such director or officer or former director or officer or person 
shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence or mis-
conduct in the performance of duty. Such indemnification shall not be deemed exclusive 
of any other rights to which those indemnified may be entitled under any by-law, agree-
ment, vote of stockholders, or otherwise." 
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statute had indicated that this indemnity provision offered a rather 
broad basis of recovery.3 In the principal case, however, the court felt 
that there was no possibility of bringing the facts within the protection 
of the by-law,4 suggesting a more strict interpretation of the indemnity 
language.5 As a matter of interpreting the by-law's language, the 
correctness of the court's decision does not appear debatable. A con-
tract made with the corporation by a prospective director simply does 
not arise by reason of his "being or having been" a director of that 
corporation. However, it would seem that legitimate litigation expenses 
of suits attacking contracts to become a director should be reimbursable 
to the innocent director in order to fulfill the policy which brought 
about the adoption of this type statute. The reasons for the existence of 
such indemnity statutes are (1) to induce responsible men to accept 
the post, (2) to encourage directors to resist unjust charges in confidence 
that, if innocent, they will be reimbursed for expenses of defense, and 
(3) to discourage derivative suits of the "strike"6 variety.7 A contract made 
with a corporation to become a director, while in a sense made in an 
individual capacity, certainly is a closely related and necessary part of 
being a director. If indemnity is not allowed to the innocent director 
sued on his employment contract, all the objectives of the statute are 
in some measure defeated. The director's contract of employment is 
an inviting area in which "strike" suits can be brought in the hope 
that the director will buy off unjust claims rather than bear the great 
expense of litigation;8 and the vulnerability to such suits attacking 
the terms of the employment contract will remain a possible deterrent 
to responsible men becoming directors. The problem is not confined 
to Delaware. About one third of the states have adopted indemnity 
8 Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., (3d Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 888. The director 
involved was found innocent, in a stockholder's derivative action, of wasting corporate 
assets. In action by the director for reimbursement the court allowed full recovery of 
expenses under the Delaware statute although part of the expenses were attributable 
to defending charges against himself solely as a stockholder, he had never committed 
the acts charged, and he appeared voluntarily without service of process. The directors 
expenses were held to be reasonable within the indemnity statute and by-law. See 39 
A. L. R. (2d) 566 (1954) • 
4 Princip_al case at 72. 
5 Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E. (2d) 533 (1953), 
held that the New York indemnity statute was in derogation of the common law and 
should be strictly construed. There appear to be no cases indicating whether there was 
any common law right to indemnity in Delaware. 
6 See Fuld, J., dissenting in Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456 at 479, 119 N.E. (2d) 
331 (1954), for a description and denunciation of "strike suits." 
7 In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W. (2d) 388 (1950); Solimine v. Hol• 
lander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A. (2d) 344 (1941). Bates and Zuckert, "Directors' Indemnity: 
Corporate Policy or Public Policy?" 20 HARv. Bus. REV. 244 (1942); Washington, "Litiga-
tion Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders' Suits," 40 CoL. L. REv. 431 (1940). 
s The expense of litigation in stockholders' suits against executives may amount to 
many thousands of dollars. See Hornstein, "Directors' Expenses in Stockholders' Suits," 
43 CoL. L. REV. 301 (1943). 
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statutes9 and under almost all of these statutes, recovery of expenses by the 
director, or others covered, is dependent upon his being involved in the 
action by reason of "being or having been" a director.10 While there 
appear to be no decisions involving a contract to become a director in 
any other state, it is to be expected that the decision of the principal 
case would affect any future interpretation of those statutes. To the 
individual considering corporate directorship, it will be important to 
know if and how he can protect himself, in view of this decision, against 
litigation expense on his contract of employment. Discounting amend-
ment of the statute, the director may be able to find protection through 
amendment of the corporate by-laws or by use of an independent con-
tract. Under the indemnity statutes having saving clauses similar to 
that in the Delaware statute11 which provides that the indemnification 
offered by the statute "shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights, 
to which those indemnified may be entitled under any by-law, agree-
ment, vote of the stockholders or otherwise," there is little doubt that 
a provision for indemnity on the contract of employment could be in-
serted into the by-laws.12 Even under statutes not containing a saving 
clause,13 an expansion to this extent might be valid. While by-laws 
9 For a complete analysis of the differences in the indemnity statutes see 52 MICH. 
L. REV. 1023 (1954); 40 CALIF. L. REv. 104 (1952). Rather than giving the corporation 
permission to provide for indemnity of officers and directors as in Delaware, some statutes 
prescribe mandatory indemnification in certain cases. E.g., California, Cal. Corp. Code 
Ann. (Deering, 1953) §830; Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §271.375; Missouri, Mo. Stat. 
Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §351.355; Montana, Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §15-412; New 
York, 22 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1943; 1957 Cum. Supp.) §64; Pennsylvania, Pa. 
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953) tit. 12, §1323. 
10 E.g., Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §5129; Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) 
§271.375; Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 53. §24; Maryland, Md. Code Ann. (1951) art. 
23, §60; Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.10 (l); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. 
(1947, 1956 Cum. Supp.) §301.09(7); Missouri, Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §351.355; 
Montana, Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §15-412; Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. (1955) §78.070(6); 
New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. (1956 Cum. Supp.) §14:3-14; Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957) 
§180.04(14). 
11 E.g., Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §5129; Maine, Me. Rev. Stat, (1954) c. 
53, §24; Maryland, Md. Code Ann. (1951) art. 23, §60; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947, 
1956 Cum. Supp.) §301.09(7); Missouri, Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §351.355; Nevada, 
Nev. Rev. Stat. (1955) §78.070(6); New Jersey, N. J. Stat. Ann. (1956 Cum. Supp.) §14:3-14; 
New York, 22 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1943; 1957 Cum. Supp.) §63; Rhode Island, 
R.I. Acts (1948) c. 2154; Wisconsin, Wis Stat. Ann. (1957) §180.04(14). See note 2 supra 
for the Delaware statute. 
12 Mooney v. \Villys-Overland Motors, Inc., note 3 supra, indicates that the Overland 
by-law, which is in terms somewhat broader than the controlling statute, meets the 
requirements of public policy by the reasonable limits set on the right of indemnifica-
tion. Also, the court does not believe the statute need be construed as controlling all 
situations that might be called indemnification. See also Schwarz v. General Aniline &: 
Film Corp., note 5 supra; ,Bishop, "Current Status of Corporate Directors' Right to In-
demnification," 69 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1956). 
13 E.g., Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §271.375; Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 
§450.10 (l); Montana, Mont . .Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §15-412; New York, 22 N.Y. Consol. 
Laws (McKinney, 1943; 1957 Cum. Supp.) §64. In California, .the statutory relief is ex. 
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must not be inconsistent or contrary to the governing statute,14 cer-
tain extensions in the by-laws beyond the statutory language would 
seem justifiable as within the policy of the statute.15 For the individual 
director, a surer method of protection is an independent contract for 
that purpose. Such a contract is indirectly sanctioned by those statutes 
containing saving clauses and should fully protect the director.16 While 
protection would not be so certain under those statutes with no saving 
clause, this type of contract would seem to be a legitimate extension of the 
statute.17 Use of an independent contract should also be suggested in those 
states not having indemnity provisions, since under the common -law of 
most states, there is no clear right to any indemnification.18 Therefore, 
although the decision of the court in the principal case is correct, it should 
serve as a warning to prospective directors that existing statutes and by-
laws may not fully protect them against personal expense arising from 
unfounded stockholders' actions. Additional safeguards may have to be 
imposed by the individual himself when asked to become a director. 
John P. Williams 
pressly made exclusive and could not be extended by contract or by-law. Cal. Corp. Code 
Ann. (Deering, 1953) §830. 
14 Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 289, 146 A. 337 (1929); Security S. & 
T. Co. v. Coos Bay L. & C. Co., 219 Wis. 647, 263 N.W. 187 (1936). 
15 See ·w ASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION 426 (1942). 
16 Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., note 3 supra, used an independent con-
tract as an alternative basis for decision allowing reimbursement. See also 40 CALIF. L. 
REV. 104 (1952). 
17 See WASHINGTON, CORPORATE 'EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION 426 (1942). 
18 Compare Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1907) and In re E. C. 
Warner Co., note 7 supra, with Jesse v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 
N.W. 276 (1922); Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N:E. 222 (1931) and N.Y. Dock 
Co. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y. S. (2d) 844 (1939). 
